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THE EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION ON THE LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES OF NATIVES
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the effects of immigration on the labor market
outcomes of less-skilled natives. Working from a simple model of a local labor
market, we show that the effects of immigration can be estimated from the
correlations between the fraction of immigrants in a city and the employment
and wage outcomes of natives. The size of the effects depend on the fraction
and skill composition of the immigrants. We go on to compute these
correlations using city-specific outcomes for individuals in 120 major SMSA's
in the 1970 and 1980 Censuses. We also use the relative industry distributions
of immigrants and natives to provide a direct assessment of the degree of labor
market competition between them.
Our empirical findings indicate a modest degree of competition between
immigrants and less-skilled natives. A comparison of industry distributions
shows that an increase in the fraction of immigrants in the labor force
translates to an approximately equivalent percentage increase in the supply of
labor to industries in which less-skilled natives are employed. Based on this
calculation, immigrant influws between 1970 and 1980 generated 1-2 percent
increases in labor supply to these industries in most cities. A comparison of
industry distributions of less-skilled natives in high- and low-immigrant share
cities between 1970 and 1980 shows some displacement out of low-wage immigrant-
intensive industries.
We find little effect of immigration on the employment outcomes of the
four race/sex groups that we consider. Our estimates of the effect of
immigration on the wages of less-skilled natives are sensitive to the
specification and estimation procedure. However, our preferred estimates,
which are based on first differences between 1980 and 1970 and the use of
instrumental variables to control for the endogeneity of immigrant inflows,
imply that an increase in immigrants equal to 1 percent of an SMSA's population
reduces native wages by roughly 1.2 percent.
Joseph C. Altonji David Card
Department of Economics Department of Economics
Northwestern University Princeton University
2003 Sheridan Road Princeton, NJ 08544
Evanston, IL 60208 (609)452-4045
(312)491-8218One of the most controversial aspects of immigration policy is the
extent to which the arrival of immigrants helps or harms less-skilled
natives. Although economists have developed a variety of theoretical
models to analyze this question,1 relatively little empirical evidence is
available.2 In this paper we use variation in the fraction of immigrants
across different cities to measure the effects of immigration on the labor
market outcomes of less-skilled natives. We assemble information from the
1970 and 1980 Censuses on labor market outcomes of natives in 120 major
cities. Information from consecutive Censuses allows us to correlate
changes in immigrant fractions with changes in native outcomes within
cities -- therebyabstracting from differences across cities that might
bias a simpler cross-sectic-'al analysis. We also provide a variety of
information on the industry distributions of natives and immigrants, and
analyze the changes in these distributions that have occurred in cities
with higher and lower immigrant shares.
In the first section of the paper we present a simple theoretical model
that describes the effects of immigration on the domestic labor market. We
assume that the labor market within each city consists of skilled and
unskilled workers, and that immigration adds workers to both sectors, with
relative additions depending on the nature of immigrant inflows to the city
in question. Our theoretical framework departs from earlier models in two
ways. On one hand, we disaggregate labor along skill lines, rather than
LSee, for example, Johnson (1980a, l980b), Chiswick (1982) or Borjas (1987b).
of the available evidence is summarized by Greenwood and
McDowell (1986), General Accounting Office (1988) and Papademetriou et. a]-.
(1989). Twostudiesof particular relevance to ours are Grossman (1982)
and Borjaa (1987b). Lalonde and Topel (1988) provide a parallel study to
ours, focussing on the effects of recent immigrants on the labor market
outcomes of earlier immigrants. Muller and Espenshade (1985) analyze the
effect of immigrants on various California cities.2
along th. lines of national origin. On the other hand, we allow for
demand-sid effects associated with increases in the local population, and
for supply-side effects associated with the possible crowding-out of native
workers in response to lower wage rates. The model leads to a simple
empirical specification in which wage and employment outcomes of less-
skilled natives (either in cross-section or within cities over time) vary
with the share and skill composition of immigrants in the local labor
market.
In the second section of the paper we address the question of whether
immigrants and natives within the same city compete in the same labor
market. Given the size of immigrant flows during the last twodecades,our
theoretical analysis implies that large adverse affects on less-skilled
natives are unlikely unless increases in immigration lead to
proportionately larger increases in the supply of labor to less-skilled
jobs. We focus on industry-specific labor markets within cities. We
develop a simple index which measures the impact of a given inflow of
immigrants on the labor market of natives. We find that a onepercentage
point increase in the share of immigrants in a city generates approximately
a one-percent increase in the supply of labor to industries in which less-
skilled natives are employed. The degree of competition between immigrants
and lesa-skjlled natives varies somewhat by race and sex group, being
highestforblack females, and lowest for black males. Overall, however,
the results suggest that immigrants are not sufficiently concentrated in
the industries that employ less-skilled natives to have large impacts on
the less-skilled native groups.3
We go on to investigate whether immigrant inflows have displaced less-
skilled natives from certain industries. Here, we compare the industry
distributions of less-skilled natives in cities with relatively high and
relatively low immigrant densities. We find some evidence that lass-
skilled natives in high-immigrant cities have moved out of immigrant-
intensive industries. We also find that the nation-wide trend of falling
employment in these industries has been slower in high-immigrant cities,
suggesting that the availability of immigrant labor has enabled certain
low-wage industries to survive in high-immigrant cities.3
In the third section of the paper we turn to a regression analysis of
the relation between immigrant shares (or the change in immigrant shares)
and employment outcomes of natives (or the change in these outcomes) across
major cities. The results vary somewhat between the cross-sectional and
first-difference analyses. We argue, however, that the first-difference
analysis is less likely to be contaminated by city-specific factors that
affect immigrant densities and native outcomes. The analysis of changes
shows no effect of increased immigration on participation or employment
rates of less-skilled natives. It does reveal a systematically negative
effect on native wages, although the specific estimates depend upon the
group and upon whether or not we useaninstrumental variables procedure to
account for the fact that immigration inflows may depend on local labor
market conditions. For the four race/sex groups that we consider, the
instrumental variables estimates (which we prefer) imply that an inflow of
similar conclusion is reached by Kuhn and Wooten (1987) and
PapademetriouJ1(1989),Chapter 4.4
immigrants equal to 1 percent of an SMSA's population4, reduces average
weekly earnings of less-skilled natives by about 1.2 percent. The least
squares estimates, by comparison, imply a more modest .3 percent reduction'.
I.Analytical Framework
Ourframeworkfor analyzing the effect of immigration on the labor
market outcomes of less-skilled natives is to view the inflow of immigrants
to each city (or, more precisely, Standard Metropolitan Area) as an outward
shift in the supply of labor. Since we are specifically interested in the
effects of immigration on less-skilled natives, we consider a two-sector
labor market consisting of skilled and unskilled labor. Within skill
categories we make no distinction between native and immigrant labor, nor
between earlier and later cohorts of immigrants. We assume that the
demands for skilled and unskilled labor in each city are decreasing
functions of their respective wage rates, and that prices of capital and
other inputs are exogenous to the local labor market.
This framework contrasts with the one adopted by Borjas (l987b), for
example, who treats immigrants and natives as separate factors of
production and assumes that locally-produced output is sold at an exogenous
price. In this case the conventional elasticities of labor demand are
undefined, sinc, an increase in the wage rate of one type of labor with
other factor prices held constant leads to an increase in marginal cost
The average change in the percentage of immigrants between 1970 and
1980 in the 120 cities in our sample is 1.4 percent, and ranges between 0
and 11.4 percent.5
that drives local firms out of business.5Given that many of the goods
produced within a city are non-traded services, however, and that many
others enjoy some degree of imperfect substitutability due to
transportation costs, we believe it is more reasonable to posit the
existence of downward-sloping labor demand functions at the local level.
The observation that the demand for labor within a local economy arises
in part from the demand for location-specific goods and services implies
that a partial equilibrium model of the labor market is potentially
misleading. In the extreme case, if LU. output is locally consumed, and if
new immigrants arrive in the same skill proportions as the existing labor
force, then an influx of immigrants leads to a new equilibrium at the
original wage rates, with proportionately higher levels of employment,
output, and consumption." More generally, the arrival of new immigrants
shifts the demand for city output and hence the demand functions for
skilled and unskilled labor. The size of this effect depends on the share
of output consumed locally and on the relative skill composition of the
existing and immigrating labor forces.
To illustrate these propositions and establish a framework for our
empirical analysis, consider an urban economy with two goods: a locally-
produced good (or service), Y, that is consumed locaF.y and exported to
51fthe price of output is exogenous it is more convenient to work
with the elasticities of factor prices with respect to factor quantities,
holding constant marginal cost. These are usually known as elasticities of
complementarity: see Hamermesh (1986), for example.
6This depends of course on constant returns to scale and on perfectly
elastic supplies of capital and other inputs.6
other cities; and an imported national good.7 Assume that Y is produced by
a competitive industry with a constant-returns-to-scale technology using
skilled labor, unskilled labor, and other inputs (capital and/or raw
materials) whose prices are exogenous and fixed.8 Under these conditions,
total industry cost (in units of the imported good) is described by a
function of the form
C(w,w,Y) —Yc(w,w),
where w and w3 represent the real wages of unskilled and skilled labor (in
units of the imported good), and c(.) is a unit cost function.9 Let q
represent the unit price of local output (denoted in units of the imported
good). The assumptions of constant returns and perfect competition imply
q_c(w3w).
Demand for Y arises from three sources: local demand from skilled
workers, Y; local demand from unskilled workers, Y; and export demand
from the rest of the economy, Y,. Let D5(q,w) and D(q,w) represent the
per capita demand functions of skilled and unskilled workers, respectively,
and let D(q) represent the demand function for locally produced output
from the rest of the economy. Let P5 and P represent the populations of
skilled and unskilled workers in the city,anddenote the total population





71n order to avoid the theoreticalprediction of factor price
equalization across cities, it is necessary to assume that the number of
goods produced within a cityisless than the numberoflocally-supplied
factors, See KuhnandWooten (1987) for a further discussion of this point.
ignore land or any other locally supplied factors.
9For notationalsimplicity we suppress the dependence of c(.) on the
prices of non-labor inputs.7
Let L(w,q) and L(v.q) represent the per capita labor supply
functions of skilled and unskilled workers, respectively. Equilibrium in





wherec1(.) and c2(.) denote the partial derivatives of the unitcost
function with respect to unskilled and skilled wage rates, respectively.
Suppose that in an Initial equilibrium the fraction of unskilled workers
in the local population is a — Wewish to analyze the effect of an
inflow of immigrants of size I. Let a represent the share of unskilled
workers in the new group. The effects of an Immigrant inflow can be
obtained by differentiating equations (1), (2a), and (2b), and making use
of the fact that the proportional change in the price of output, q/q,
equals the share-weighted sum of the proportional changes in all factor
prices.
For simplicity, assume that the cross-elasticities of the output demand
and labor supply are zero)° Then the proportional changes in skilled and
unskilled wage rates satisfy the following pair of equations:
(3a) (a/a) LI/P — - c)log w + log w,
(3b)A (l-a)/(l-a) LI/P — log w + (- c)Mog w,
where is the elasticity of labor demand for skill group i with respect
to the wage of group j, c is the elasticity of labor supply of group i,
and A and A are a pair of numbers between 0 and 1:
s u
101n the notation of equations (1) and (2), 8D(q,w)/ôw —0and
8L(w,q)/8q —0for j—(u,s).8
—(Y- -• Y)/ Y, k1 —
A—(Yk2 •Yu-Y)/ Y, k2 —a(l-a)/(a(l-a)).
The labor demand elasticities in equations (3a) and (3b) are determined




where is the share of the value of output paid as wages to skill group
I, is the partial elasticity of substitution of skill group i with
respect to group j, andis the elasticity of demand for Y with respect to
its relative price q (a weighted average of the elasticities of demand
exhibited by consumers in the local market and those elsewhere in the
economy).
The expressions A (a/a) M/P and A5 (l-a)/(l.a) SI/P in equations (3a)
and (3b) give the effective percentage increases in unskilled and skilled
labor resulting from an inflow of immigrants I. The increases in skilled
and unskilled populations are aAI and (l-a)I, respectively. The
proportional increases in the populations of unskilled and skilled workers
are therefore (a/a) SI/P and (l-a)/(l-a) LI/P, respectively. The factors
A and A adjust the gross increases in labor supply for the net increases
in demand generated by the new immigrants. If local output is consumed
entirely within the city and immigration is balanced in the sense that a —
a,then A —A—0.Otherwise, the effective increases in labor supply
depend on the fraction of local output sold outside the city, and on the
imbalance of skill ratios between the existing and newly-arriving
population. In the simple case where newly-arriving immigrants have the
sameskillsas the existing population, Au —A—x'"'the fraction of
output exported. If newly-arriving immigrants are less-skilled, however,9
> >A, accentuating the effective increase in unskilled labor
supply.
Using equations (3a) and (3b), changes in wages rates can be related to
changes in the fraction of immigrants in the local population (f) by noting
that of —(I/P)—(1-f)LI/P. In the special case that the demand for
unskilled labor is independent of the wage rate of skilled labor (i.e.







whichspecializes to the formula derived by Johnson (1980a) when A —1and
a —a.Our model extends Johnson's earlier analysis in two directions:
by allowing for skilled and unskilled workers in the existing and
immigrating populations; and by accounting in a very simple manner for the
effect of added population on the demand for local output.
If the demand for unskilled workers depends on the wage rate of skilled
labor (i.e. 00),then the expression for the change in unskilled wage
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11Johnson(1980a) makes the further assumption that the elasticity of
labor supply among existing immigrants is 0, so that the effective supply
elasticity in the market for unskilled labor is (1-f )c,where f is the
fraction of immigrants in the existing pool of unskihed workers, and c is
the labor supply elasticity of natives.10
Using the labor supply function, the change in the per capita labor supply
of unskilled natives can then be written as
(6) log L —£ •BSI/P.
To get some idea of the magnitude of the coefficient B relating wage
changes to immigrant inflows, suppose that—a,so that A A. In this
case, equation (5) can be rewritten as
1og w — Ab AI/P,
where the coefficient b (b <0)is a function only of the supply and
demand elasticities for skilled and unskilled labor, and A equals the
fraction of local production exported to other cities. Values of the
coefficient b corresponding to alternative values of the supply and demand
parameters of the model are displayed in Table 1. The rows of the table
present alternative choices for the ratio between the partial elasticity of
unskilled labor with respect to non-labor inputs and the partial
elasticity of skilled labor with respect to non-labor inputs '°skThe
share-weighted average of these two elasticities is constrained to equal
.6.12 The columns of the tablepresent alternative choices for the partial
elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor su For
each choice of the technological parameters, two values of b are reported,
corresponding to alternative choices for the elasticities of labor supply:
0.1 and 1.0. Other parameters in the model are set as follows: the share
of skilled labor (9) —.4;the share of unskilled labor (9) —.3;and the
elasticity of demand for city output (7) —-2.5.
U°UIC + Ssosk —6' +6), where 9 represents the value
share of labor in the ,Jth skillgroup.11
The first row of the table presents calculated values of b under the u
assumption that capital is a substitute for unskilled labor and a
complement for skilled labor.13 As Hamermesh (1986, pp. 460-462) has noted
in his review of the literature on labor demand, many empirical studies
based on the distinction between blue collar and white collar workers in
manufacturing have confirmed this hypothesis. In contrast, the last row of
the table presents values of bu under the assumption that skilled and
unskilled labor are equally substitutable with capital.14 Despite the wide
variation in demand and supply parameters represented in the table, the
range of the coefficient b is relatively modest: from -.49to -.27.15
Under the assumption that immigrants add nothing to the demand for locally-
produced output (i.e., \ —1)these coefficients imply that a 1 percent
increase in the population of a city due to an influx of immigrants with
the same skill composition as the existing labor force reduces unskilled
wages by .3 to .5 percent. The implied reduction in the per-capita labor
supply of natives (and existing immigrants) is proportional to this
reduction in wages, multiplied by the elasticity of labor supply. If the
entries are included in the first row under the column for a —.25.In this row of the table, akis strongly negative (-.525).
Tlus skilled and unskilled labor must b relatively strong substitutes
(i.e. a >.8)to satisfy the restrictions on the matrix of partial
elasticjes.
14If a —ak' equation (5) impliesthat the value of the
coefficient is independent of the substitutability between skilled and
unskilled labor.
5The elasticities of demand for unskilled labor withrespect to its
ownwagerate (,)impliedby the parameter choices in Table 1 range from
-1.0 (in the lower left-hand entries of the table) to -2.6 (in the upper
right-hand entries of the table).12
elasticity of labor supply elasticity is in the range of 0 to 1, the
implied reduction in per capita labor supply of natives is 0- .5 percent.
The magnitude of these predicted effects is d.ampened by any
expansionary effect that immigrants have on the demand for locally produced
goods. For example, if one-third of output is consumed locally, then the
implied wage effects of a given immigrant inflow are reduced by
16
approximately one-third. Any imbalance in the skill distribution of
arriving immigrants, on the other hand, accentuates their impact on the
local labor market. In the most extreme case, if newly arriving immigrants
are all unskilled, and the proportion of skilled workers in the existing
labor force is .5, then the predicted value of b ranges from -2.0 to -1.0,
implying roughly 2-3 times larger effects on unskilled wage rates.
Our empirical strategy in Section III, below, is to correlate
variation in the share of immigrants in the local labor market with
variation in the employment and wage outcomes of less-skilled natives. We
interpret the coefficient relating wages to immigrant shares as an estimate
of the expression B in equation (5), and the coefficient relating
employment rates (or participation rates) to immigrant shares as an
estimate of the product of and the supply elasticity of unskilled native
workers. As the previous discussion makes clear, the value of depends
on the nature of immigrant flows to each city, and on the characteristics
of th. demand for output produced in each city. Even ignoring these issues
(as we do), it is important to keep in mind the potential endogeneity of
16Estimates of the fraction ofoutput produced in a city that is
consumed locally are not easily obtained. Roughly 35 percent of consumer
expenditures are allocated to personal, health, business, and education
services, public utilities, transportation services and other goods with a
high local content.13
immigrant inflows to different cities. If the supply of immigrants is
wage-elastic, then the covariation across cities between the labor market
outcomes of natives and the share of immigrants in the labor market will be
a positively-biased estimate of the expression B. In our analysis we
address this issue with an instrumental variables scheme that isolates the
component of immigrant inflows associated with the pre-determined
characteristics of each city.
Before turning to the empirical work, two limitations of the model
deserve discussion. First, the model assumes that the existing native
population is immobile. However, one might loosely interpret the supply
elasticity of natives to reflect both labor supply changes of the current
population of the city and out-migration (or in-migration) of natives to
(or from) other cities.1 If one interprets the inter-city mobility of
natives as raising the long run elasticity of labor supply, then one would
conclude that migration by natives in response to immigrant inflows would
lower the effect of immigration on wages. It would also lower the effect
on labor supply per capita of natives, as measured by a variable such as
the employment/population ratio.'8 However, inter-city migration would
imply spillover effects on wages and employment/population ratios in other
cities, which we ignore in our empirical work.
17
If the immigrants are primarily unskilled, then one might expect
out-migration of unskilled natives and in-migration of skilled natives.
18Filer (1988) shows that the net migration rate of natives to an SMSA
between 1975 and 1980 is negatively related to the migration rate of
immigrants into the SMSA between 1970 and 1974 and to the migration rate of
immigrants into the SMSA between 1975 and 1980.The negative relationship
appears to be strongest for low-skilled and less educated natives.14
Second, the model assumes that the local labor market clears. Within
the model unemployment can be viewed as depending upon the wage rate
relative to the benefits of being unemployed. This view is most sensible
in the long run. Barriers to wage adjustment (such as binding minimum wage
levels or fixed welfare benefits) might be expected to strengthen the
effect of an increase in immigrants on the employment and unemployment
outcomes of natives, while weakening the effects on wage levels relative to
those implied by equations (6) and (7). The employment effects for natives
could be especially large if employers of immigrants are less likely to
comply with minimum wage laws or to be unionized.19
II. Industry Distributions of Natives and Immigrants
Our empirical analysis is based on the labor market outcomes of less-
skilled natives in 120 major SMSA's in the 1970 and 1980 Censuses. We
consider four groups of "less-skilled" natives: white males with less than
12 years of completed education; white females with less than 13 years of
completed education; black males with less than 13 years of completed
education; and black females with less than 13 years of completed
education. Our data base consists of samples of each race-sex group drawn
from the one-in-a-hundred public-use sample of the 1970 Census and the
five-in-a-hundred "A" sample of the 1980 Census. A description of our
sampling procedures, as well as information on our procedures for matching
19
Papademtriou (1989,Ch. 4) suarize evidence from a few
industry studies suggesting that in some cases immigrant labor has been
used to undercut union firmapayinghigher wages and employing native
workers.15
SMSA definitions between the 1970 and 1980 Censuses, are provided in
Appendices A and B.
Table 2 provides an overview of our samples of less-skilled natives.
The samples are restricted to individuals between the ages of 19 and 64 who
report themselves as not in school during the Census week.2° Because of
the age and education requirements, the average age of our less-skilled
native groups is close to 40. The average years of complete schooling is
less than 8 for white male high school dropouts, and between 10 and 11 for
the other groups.
The labor market outcomes that we consider are the labor force
participation rate during the Census week; the employment rate during the
Census week (measured for those in the labor force in the Census week);
the employment-population ratio in the Census week; the fraction of people
who reported working at any time in the previous year (for simplicity, we
refer to this as the employment-population ratio last year); and the
logarithms of weeks worked and average weekly earnings during the previous
year (measured for those individuals who report positive weeks of work and
positive earnings in the previous year). Precise definitions of these
outcomes are presented in Appendix A.
The model of the previous section treats the market for less-skilled
workers within each city as homogeneous. Even within a particular city,
however, the market for less-skilled workers may be segmented along
industry lines. If immigrants and natives tend to work in different
industries, then the first-round effects of new immigration will be mainly
20By the "Census week", we mean the week immediately preceding the
administration of the Census, for which individuals report their major
activity. The Census is administered on April 1.16
concentrated among existing immigrants. If immigrants tend to work in the
same industries as a particular sub-group of natives, however, then the
effects of immigration on this subgroup of less-skilled natives will be
magnified.
Some simple evidence on the correspondence between industry-
distributions of native and immigrants is presented in Table 3. This table
shows, for the 10 two-digit industries with the highest immigrant
employment shares and the 10 industries with the lowest immigrant shares,
the fraction of each of the four less-skilled native groups in the industry
in 1980.21 High immigrant-share industries include several low-wage
manufacturing industries (apparel, leather, furniture, miscellaneous
manufacturing, and textiles) as well as low-wage service industries
(private household services, hotels and motels, restaurants and bars, and
transportation services), and agriculture. Low immigrant-share industries
include the government sector, as well as railroads, communications, and
several regionally-based industries (tobacco, pipelines, coal-mining, and
oil and gas extraction). A comparison of the second and third columns of
the table shows that industries with high or low immigrant shares in 1980
exhibited the same characteristic in 1970, although the immigrant fractions
in many industries increased sharply between 1970 and 1980.22 The
210ur two-digitindustry classification is explained in Appendix C.
220f the 10highest immigrant share industries in 1980, 7 were in the
top 10 industries by immigrant share in 1970. The rank-order correlation
across industries in 1970 and 1980 immigrant shares is .86.17
immigrant share of total employment in all industries in our sample of 120
cities increased from 6.0 percent in 1970 to 9.6 percent in 1980.23
The data in Table 3 suggest that immigrants are most directly
competitive with native women -- particularlyblack women. In fact, the
proportion of black females in the ten highest immigrant-share industries
in 1980 was almost as high as the fraction of immigrants in those
industries. By comparison, black males are the least concentrated in high
immigrant-share industries, and the most heavily concentrated in low
immigrant- share industries.
One way to evaluate the impact of immigration on a particular native
group is to calculate the overlap in the industry distribution of the group
with the industry distribution of immigrants. Assuming that inter-industry
mobility costs are large, the effects of immigration on native wages will
be directly proportional to the average increase in labor supply to
industries in which natives are employed. To formalize this measure, let
SNi represent the share of the native group in theith industry, letE
represent the initial level of total employment in industry i, and let
represent the increase in labor supply to the ith industry associated with
the arrival of a fixed number of new immigrants E. The average
proportional increase in labor supply experienced by the native group is
SNiE
23Theaverage fraction of immigrants in the total population in our
sample of cities in 1970 was .044, and ranged from .003 to .242. The
average fraction of immigrants in the total population in 1980 was .058,
and ranged from .008 to .357.18
Suppose that new immigrants sort themselves into industries in the same
proportions as existing immigrants. Then AEi —S1AE, where S1 is the
share of existing immigrants employed in industry i. Finally, E —SE,
where S is the share of all workers in industry i and E is level of total
employment in the labor market. Thus, the average proportional increase in




This expression reduces to 1 in the case of a homogeneous labor market, in
which —S1
—S.In a heterogeneous labor market, however, the
average proportional increase in labor supply experienced by a particular
native group may be more or less than E/E, depending on the degree of
similarity between the industry distributions of immigrants and the native
group.
Estimates of this index of labor market competition are presented in
Table 4 for the four groups of less-skilled native. We have calculated the
index separately using the 1970 and 1980 industry distributions of natives
and immigrants. We have also calculated the index separately over two
subsets of cities: the 20 cities with the highest fraction of less-skilled
immigrants in 1980; and the 40 cities with the lowest fraction of less-
skilled immigrants in 1980. These cities are identified in Appendix D.
Estimates of the index of labor market competition are very similar
using the 1970 and 1980 industry distribution. The values of the index
range from a low of .85 in 1980 for white males in low immigrant cities to
1.28 in 1970 for black females, and are consistently below 1 for black
males. The results confirm the impression that black females are in most19
direct competition with immigrants, whereas black males are most isolated
from immigrant competition. Nevertheless, the values of the index are not
far from 1 for any of the groups, suggesting that increases in in the share
of immigrants in the labor market have roughly proportional effects on the
labor markets of unskilled natives.24The differences in the index
between high- and low-immigrant cities are positive for males and negative
for female., suggesting that immigrants and native males are in more direct
contact in high-immigrant cities, while immigrants and native females are
in less direct contact. One interpretation of this finding is that in
high-immigrant cities, less-skilled native females have been displaced from
immigrant-intensive industries. We explore this hypothesis next.
Evidence on the extent of industry displacement is presented in Tables
S and 6, which give the cross-sectional and time-series patterns of
differences in the industry distributions of less-skilled natives in high-
immigrant and low-immigrant cities. Table 5 displays, for 10 high
immigrant-share industries and 10 major immigrant-employing industries, the
relative share of unskilled natives in high- versus low-immigrant cities.
Specifically, let and represent the employment of native group
N in industry i in high-immigrant and low-immigrant cities, respectively.
LetEand represent total employment in industry i in these cities,
and let E and E represent total employment of the native group in
total employment of the native group in these cities. Table 5 displays for
each industry and native group the ratio
should be pointed out that the index is computed from the
industry distribution of existing immigrants, and cannot be used to assess






which represents the relative employment share of natives in the ith
industry in high- versus low-immigrant cities, divided by the relative
shares of natives in total employment in those cities. A value of unity
indicates that natives have equal shares of employment in the industry in
the two groups of cities, controlling for their relative shares in total
employment. A value of less than unity, on the other hand, indicates
relative displacement in the high immigrant-fraction cities.
For most of the high-immigrant share industries there is evidence of
displacement of natives in the high-immigrant share cities. The
displacement effects are less apparent for white males, with ratios in
excess of unity for four industries.25 For the other three groups,
however, relative employment shares in the set of high-immigrant cities are
generally less than unity. 3y comparison, the evidence of displacement of
less-skilled natives from the major immigrant-employing industries in the
lower panel of Table S is mixed. On balance, these data suggest that the
industry displacement of natives is restricted to low-wage service and
manufacturing industries and agriculture. As the ratios in the right-hand
column of Table 5 suggest, these industries are generally more important in
high-immigrant than low-immigrant cities, although in cross-section it is
difficult to distinguish alternative explanations for this effect.26
25The number of white males inprivate household services is so low
that the index cannot be calculated.
26For example,many high-immigrant share cities are also major
transportation centers (New York, Loc Angeles, Miami). This fact may
partially explain the relatively high share of the transportation services21
Table 6 repeats the analysis in Table 5, taking the ratio of the
relative employment share of natives in 1980 to the relative employment
share in 1970. A value of unity for this ratio suggests that natives have
maintained their relative share of industry employment, controlling for the
relative growth of total employment of natives in the two sets of cities.
A value of less than unity, on the other hand, suggests that natives have
lost relative share in the industry in high-immigrant versus low-immigrant
27
cities.
The results in Table 6 are generally consistent with those in Table 5,
and suggest some movement of less-skilled natives out of high-immigrant
share industries in the high-immigrant cities between 1970 and 1980. The
fifth column of the table indicates the relative growth of total employment
by industry in high- versus low-immigrant share industries, while the sixth
column gives the ratio of total employment in the industry in 1980 in all
cities to total employment in all cities in 1980. Although several high-
immigrant industries were declining relatively quickly between 1970 and
1980, in most cases the relative decline was slower in high-immigrant
cities. This suggests that the availability of immigrant labor may allow
certain industries to survive in high-immigrant cities even at the same
time as natives continue to exit from these industries.
industry in the high-immigrant share cities.
is interesting to note that total employment growth rates between
1970 and 1980 for the 20 high-immigrant share cities and the 40 low-
immigrant share cities were virtually identical: the ratio of 1980 to 1970
employment was .92 for the high-immigrant share cities and .91 for the low-
immigrant share cities. The relative growth rates of less-skilled native
employment, however, were somewhat different in the two sets of cities.
The relative ratios of 1980 to 1970 employment totals in high- versus low-
immigrant cities were .96 for white males; .90 for white females, 1.02 for
black males; and .87 for black females.22
Ouranalysisof the industry distributions of immigrants and less-
skilled natives suggests three conclusions. First, a one percentage point
increase in the share of immigrants generates approximately a one percent
increase in the supply of labor to industries in which less-skilled natives
are employed. There is no indication that immigrants and less-skilled
natives are concentrated in particular industries in a manner which would
greatly accentuate the labor market competition between them, or on the
other hand substantially reduce the degree of labor market competition
between them. Second, among the four native groups that we consider,
immigrants are most directly competitive with black females, and least
competitive with black men. Third, differences in industry distributions
between high- and low-immigrant cities suggest that natives have been
displaced from some low-wage service and manufacturing industries, and that
these industries have declined less quickly in cities with more immigrants.
III. An Analysis of the Effects of Immigration on Less-Skilled Natives
In this section we examine the correlation across cities between the
labor market outcomes of less-skilled natives and the fraction of
immigrants in the city. We present cross-sectional analyses for 1970 and
1980 as well as a first-differenced analysis of changes between 1970 and
1980. Our basic approach is very simple. We regress SMSA averages of the
labor market outcome variables for our four race/sex groups against
measures of the immigrant fraction in the SMSA and a variety of controls
for the characteristics of each city. Before turning to the results of the
analysis, however, we first discuss the construction of SMSA means for the
outcome variables. We then briefly discuss potential econometric problems23
with the cross-sectional and first-differenced analyses, and offer some
comments on the interpretation of our estimates.
III.a Construction of SMSA-Level Outcome Measures and Control Variables
The first step in our analysis is to construct SMSA-specific means of
the outcome variables that are purged of differences in the observable
characteristics of the native population across different cities. Given
the limited information collected in the Census, this step amounts to
regression-adjusting the outcome variables for differences in age and
education. Such an adjustment has two potential advantages. First it
should reduce the sampling variation associated with the means of the
outcome variables across different cities. Second, it should eliminate any
bias arising from correlations between the fraction of immigrants in a city
and the age and educational attainment of natives.
For each race/sex group in each of the two censuses we regress each of
the outcome variables against a full set of SMSA dummies and a flexible
function of age and education. Specifically, we include a cubic polynomial
in age, a detailed set of dummy variables for different education levels,
and a full set of interactions of age and education up to the second order.
We then use the estimated SMSA dummies as our regression-adjusted outcome
28
measures.
The explanatory variables in our analysis include the fraction of
immigrants in each SMSA and three additional control variables: the
logarithm of SMSA population; and SMSA-specific means of age and education
for the particular race/sex group under consideration. Although the
outcome variables are adjusted for age and education, we found in
28A similar approach is used by Borjas (l987b).24
preliminary work that the mean of adjusted weekly earnings is correlated
across cities with the mean of education, particularly for blacks. We have
no explanation for this phenomenon, although it may indicate a correlation
across cities between the quality and quantity of education among blacks,
or possibly a market externality associated with higher levels of education
among the less-skilled black population. In any case, weinclude SMSA-
specific means of age and education for the particular race/sex group in
all of our SMSA-level regressions. These means are calculated directly
from our native extracts.
Our measure of the fraction of immigrants in each SMSA is the fraction
of foreign-born residents, taken from published tabulations of the 1970 and
1980 Censuses. From the standpoint of the theoretical model it would be
preferable to use the fraction of immigrants in the local labor force.
Since our sample sizes for 1970 are too small to provide reliable estimates
of the fraction of immigrants in many of the smaller cities, we have relied
instead on the published population data. Provided that changes in the
immigrant labor force are proportional to changes in the population of
immigrants, the use of fraction of immigrants in the population will not
affect our results.
III.b Econometric Issues
We next turn to a brief discussion of our estimating equations. We
focus on three issues: possible sources of bias in the estimating
equations; the interpretation of differences between cross-sectional and
first-differenced estimates of the effects of immigration; and the use of
weighted least squares in the estimation.25
Our cross-sectional estimating equations have the form
(7) NJ - b+ f C +
where Nj is the adjusted labor market outcome for native group N in
city J, is a vector of control variables for the race/sex group and
city (the mean of age and education for the group, and the logarithm of
SMSA population), f1 is the fraction of immigrants in the city, and eNi
a residual term. Similarly, our first-differenced estimating equations
have the form
(8) Nj —XNj
b + C +
where refers to the change in the variable Z in city j between 1970 and
1980.
Depending on the choice of outcome measure Y, these equations have the
form of equations (5) or (6) derived from our theoretical model. The
interpretation of estimates of the coefficient c obtained from equation (7)
or (8), however, depends on the nature of the residual terms in these
equations. These residuals can be decomposed into two conceptually
distinct components: (1) a market-level SMSA effect due to factors other
than immigration (for example, unmeasured characteristics of natives or
demand shocks affecting the local economy); and (2) sampling variation
arising from the fact that we observe only a sample of natives in each
SMSA. Let Nj represent the true population value of the outcome variable
for natives in city j. Then we may decompose eNJ as
eNj aNi + ''Nj -'Nj
wherea represents the SMSA effect due tofactors other than
immigration and Nj -Nj
is the component of eNl attributable to26
sampling variability. Only if a is orthogonal to the fraction of
immigrants in the city will estimates of the coefficient c from the cross-
sectional regression (7) yield unbiased estimates of B or c•B, as
described by equation (5) or (6). In the first-differenced specification
the corresponding requirement is that changes in the unmeasured SMSA
effects be uncorrelated with changes in the fraction of immigrants in the
city between 1970 and 1980.
Clearly, the main advantage of the first-differenced analysis is that
it eliminates any bias introduced by city-specific fixed effects that are
correlated with the fraction of immigrants in a city and the labor market
outcomes of natives. Transitory effects (associated with transitory
fluctuations in the demand for the output of specific cities, for example)
will still lead to biases in the differenced analysis if they influence the
inflow rate of immigrants. The recent analysis of Bartel (1988) suggests
that economic conditions have a relatively small effect on the destination
city chosen by immigrants. Instead, Bartel's findings suggest that
immigrants are mainly attracted to cities with large concentrations of
previous immigrants from the samecountry.29 Nevertheless,her research
leaves open the possibility that the timing and size of immigrant inflows
are affected by economic conditions in particular cities.
We attempt to control for any potential correlation between immigrant
inflows and local economic conditions in our first-differenced analysis by
an instrumental variables procedure. As suggested by Bartel's (1988) work,
we use the fraction of immigrants in a city in 1970 to predict the change
29
See also Greenwood and McDowell's survey.27
in the fraction of immigrants over the following decade.3° Immigrant
inflows are strongly correlated with the initial fraction of immigrants in
a city, and these variables are reasonably strong predictors of the change
in immigrant fraction.
In comparing the cross-section and first-difference results one should
also keep in mind that the first-difference analysis is more likely to
capture the short-run effects of immigration, in which the capital stock
and the industry/skill composition of labor demand have not had time to
fully adjust. The effects of immigration on per capita employment rates
and wages may weaken over time as natives move to other cities or to labor
market sectors that are less affected by immigrant competition. Dynamic
issues are not addressed in our formal model, but we suspect that the short
run effects of immigration on employment of less-skilled natives will be
larger than the long run effects. The relative magnitude of the short run
and long run effects on wages depend on whether there are barriers to wage
adjustments in the short run. In fact, we find that the cross sectional
estimates of the effect of immigration on employment outcomes of natives
are larger than the differenced estimates, whereas the opposite is true of
the estimated effects on wages. This leads us to suspect that the
differences between the cross-sectional and differenced results are
primarily due to correlations between city-specific effects and immigrant
30An alternative strategy is study the impact of immigrant flows to
particular SMSA's that one can identify as exogenous. For example, Card
(1989) examines the impact of the Mariel boat lift on the Miami labor
market and finds little effect on the wages and unemployment rates of less
skilled blacks and other non-Cuban groups. His results for wages are
somewhat at variance with the instrumental variables estimates we report below.28
shares that are eliminated in first-differences rather than to a
distinction between long run and short run effects.
A final econometric issue arises from the relatively small samples of
black natives in manycities,particularly in our 1970 sample. We restrict
our cross-sectional and differenced analysis of each race/sex group to the
set of cities for which we have at least 30 group members in both 1970 and
1980. Consequently, we work with a set of 91 cities for black males, a set
of 94 cities for black females, and a full set of 120 cities for white men
and women. We also use weighted least squares methods to estimate our
equations, using the square root of the number of observations for the
race/sex group in the city as a weight. In our first-differenced
spe ifications we use as a weight (N701 +N80)4'2,where N70 and N80
are the numberofobservations for the native subgroup in the SMSA in 1970
and 1980, respectively.31 This weighting scheme assumes that the residual
eNi arises mainlyfrom sampling variability associated with the estimated
outcome measure. Even controlling for the covariates in our models,
however, the labor market outcomes of different race/sex groups are
correlated across cities, suggesting the presence of omitted city-specific
effects. We have not adjusted our standard errors or estimation procedures
to take account of such error components.
III.c EmDirical Results
31• vestimationof the first difference equation also uses these
weights.29
To provide an introduction and overview of our results, Table 7
presents weighted least-squares estimates of the effects of immigration on
the labor market outcomes of the pooled set of four race/sex groups. The
estimated equations include unrestricted intercepts for the four groups, as
well as group-specific coefficients on the means of age and education. The
coefficients on the immigrant share variable and the population variable,
however, are restricted to be the same across the four native subgroups.
The cross-sectional results for 1970 show significantly negative
effects of an increase in immigrant shares on the labor force participation
rates and employment rates of less-skilled natives. The results imply that
a 10 percentage point increase in the fraction of immigrants in an SMSA
would lead to a reduction in the employment/population ratio of less-
skilled natives of roughly 2 percent. The employment rate would also fall
by 1. percent, implying an increase in unemployment rates of about 1
percent. Among those who work, average weeks per year would fall by about
2 percent.
These negative employment effects contrast sharply with the finding
that immigration has a positive effect on weekly wages. The estimated
coefficient in row 6 implies that a .1 increase in the immigrant share
would lead to a 4.7 percent increase in weekly earnings. Within the
context of our model, these results can only be reconciled if the labor
supply elasticity of less-skilled natives is negative.32
implied per capita labor supply elasticity is roughly -1.Art
alternativeexplanation, which might be consistent with an extended version
of the model allowing for heterogeneity within the population of less-
skilled natives, is that a downward shift in the wage distribution induced
by immigration results in the exit from the labor force of natives with the
lowest skilled levels. However, given that the decline in the employment
population ratio is small, a compositional shift cannot explain the results30
The 1980 cross-sectional results for the various employment outcomes
also indicate a negative effect of immigration, although the estimated
coefficients are smaller in magnitude than those for 1970. In the 1980
data, however, the estimated effect of immigrant densities on the average
weekly earnings of natives is essentially zero. This gives some reason for
caution in the interpretation of the 1970 results.
Weighted least-squares estimates of the first-differenced
specification are presented in the third column of Table 7. In contrast to
the cross-sectional results, these estimates suggest a modest oositive
effect of the fraction of immigrants on the employment outcomes of natives.
The estimated effect on earnings per week is negative (-.267)but not
sttisticallydifferent from 0.
Instrumental-variables estimates of the first-differenced specification
are presented in column 4. These estimates give an ambiguous picture of
the effect of immigration on the employment outcomes of natives. A
marginally significant positive effect on the employment rate in the Census
weak is counterbalanced by a marginally significant negative effect on the
employment-population ratio last year. Nevertheless, the instrumented
first-differenced results indicate a significantly negative effect of
immigration on wages. The coefficient is -1.2 with a standard error of
.242. The more negative effect associated with the IV estimation scheme is
consistent with the hypothesis that the least-squares estimate is
positively biased by endogenous immigration inflows.
even if the wages of those who leave employment were essentially 0 prior to
their departure.31
The pooled data suggest that the effect of immigrant densities on the
employmentandparticipation rates of natives is small and potentially
zero. If the instrumented first-differenced specification is taken at face
value, however, the effect on wages is apparently negative. For the most
part, these conclusions carry over to the detailed results for the four
subgroups, to which we now turn.
Results for Individual Race/Sex GrouDs
Estimates of the relation between immigrant fractions and the labor
market outcomes of black males are presented in Table 8, which has the same
format as Table 7. As in the pooled analysis, the cross-sectional results
for black men suggest a negative correlation between the fraction of
immigrants and employment outcomes. In the differenced analysis, however,
the relation is much less consistent. Likewise, although the 1970 cross-
sectional analysis suggests a positive effect of immigration on black male
wages, the 1980 cross-sectional results and thedifferenced results
indicate a negative effect.
The results for white male dropouts are presented in Table 9. These
results are very similar to those for black males, although the point
estimates of the effects of immigration on wages are somewhat smaller in
magnitude. Again, the differenced specifications in particular suggest a
negative effect of immigrant densities on native wage rates,while the
effects on employment and participation rates are smaller and vary withthe
precise measure of employment.
The regression results for black females in Table 10 are of particular
interest, given the evidence in Section II that black women are incloser32
competition with immigrants than the other three groups. Nevertheless, the
estimated coefficients for this group are not much different than those for
the other groups. The cross-sectional results suggest a small negative
effect of immigrant shares on employment outcomes, and a modest positive
effect on weekly wages. These conclusions are reversed, however, in the
first-differenced analysis, which suggest a generally positive effect on
employment rates, and a negative effect on wage rates. The differenced
results for black females are not particularly sensitive to choice of
least-squares or instrumental variables estimation, a1thoug as in previous
tables the strongest negative wage effect is obtained by the instrumental
variables procedure.
Table 11 presents our results for white females. Again the cross-
sectional results for 1970 indicate a negative relation between immigrant
shares and employment outcomes, while the differenced analysis indicates
much weaker effects. The cross-sectional and first-differenced
specifications fit by least-squares suggest a positive effect of immigrant
shares on wage rates. When the change in immigrant share is instrumented,
however, the estimated wage coefficient is negative and consistent with the
results for the other native groups.
A check on the wage effects reported for the different native groups
in Tables 7-11 is contained in Table 12. Here, we estimate the same
specifications using the wage outcomes of immigrant workers as the
dependent variable. We use two measures of immigrant wages: the mean of
actual log weekly earnings for male immigrants; and an adjusted mean that
controls for the average levels of age and education of immigrants in each
city. The results reveal three findings. First, unadjusted mean earnings33
of immigrants are more strongly correlated in cross-section with the
fraction of immigrants than mean earnings that have been adjusted for
measured skill attributes. This suggests a negative correlation between
the skill level of immigrants and their fraction in the population.
Second, as we found for the native groups, the instrumental variables
estimate of the first-differenced specification leads to the largest
negative estimate of the effect of immigrant densities on wages. Finally,
the instrumental variables estimates of the effect of immigrant shares on
immigrant wages is very similar to the corresponding estimate for native
wages. There is no evidence that immigrants have a stronger negative
effect on their own wages than on those of less-skilled natives.
Other Results
We estimated many of our least-squares models for the 1970, 1980, and
1980-1970 samples with a control for the fraction of blacks in the SMSA
population. This addition made little difference to the results.
We also re-estimated many of our specifications using the fraction of
Nless..skilledu immigrants in the SMSA population in place of the overall
fraction of immigrants in the SMSA population. We defined the fraction of
1lessskilledR immigrants as the product of the faction of immigrants in
the SMSA population and the fraction of male immigrants in the SMSA whose
predicted earnings are less than the national median for male immigrants.
(See Appendix D).The (unweighted) correlation across 120 cities between
the lessskilledR immigrant fraction and the total immigrant fraction is
.94 in 1970 and .95 in 1980.The correlation of changes in the two
immigrantmeasures is .82. Perhaps as a result, least squares results34
using the fraction of less-skilled iigrants are similar to those reported
in tables 7-11. The regression coefficients typically increase in absolute
value, reflecting the fact that the scale of the less-skilled immigrant
variable is compressed relative to the other variable. It is worth noting
that instrumental variables estimates (using the fraction of immigrants in
the SMSA in 1970 and its square as instruments) point to a somewhat larger
negative effect of the fraction of less-skilled immigrants on the weekly
earnings of natives. The coefficients for black males, white males, black
females, and white females are -7.0, -4.8, -12.9 and -12.3 respectively.
These estimates are very imprecise, however, perhaps because the
correlation between fraction of immigrants in £970 and the change in
f 'ction of less-skilled immigrants in the SMSA is only
Finally, we re-estimated the 1980 cross-sectional specifications and
the first-differenced specifications for each of our labor market outcome
variables using the SMSA-specific mean of the corresponding labor market
outcome for white males age 31-64 with 13 or more years of schooling as a
control variable. We view this approach, which uses the labor market
outcomes of highly-skilled workers to control for general labor market
conditions within each city, as an alternative to our instrumental
variables procedure. It is strictly correct only if, in contrast to the
implications of our model, immigration has no effect on more highly
educated white males. The results from this alternative procedure are
generally similar to our ordinary least-squares estimates, and suggest
In contrast, the correlation between the fraction of immigrants
in 1970 and change in fraction of all iigrants in the SMSA is .597.
These correlations refer to the unweighted sample of 120 SMSA's.35
smaller negative impacts of immigration on less-skilled native wages than
the instrumental variables procedure.
IV.Conclusions
This paper presents a variety of evidence on the effects of immigration
on the labor market outcomes of less-skilled natives. Working from a
simple theoretical model of a local labor market, we show that the effects
of immigration can be estimated from the correlations between the fraction
of immigrants in a city and the employment and wage outcomes of natives.
We go on the compute these correlations using city-specific outcomes for
individuals in 120 major SMSA's in the 1970 and 1980 Censuses. We also use
the relative industry distributions of immigrants and natives to provide a
direct assessment of the degree of labor market competition between them.
Our empirical findings indicate a modest degree of competition between
immigrants and less-skilled natives. A comparison of industry
distributions shows that an increase in the fraction of immigrants in the
labor force translates to an approximately equivalent percentage increase
in the supply of labor to industries in which less-skilled natives are
employed. Based on this calculation, immigrant inflows of the magnitude
observed between 1970 and 1980 generated 1-2 percent increases in labor
supply to these industries in most cities. A comparison of the industry
distributions of less-skilled natives in high- and low-immigrant share
cities between 1970 and 1980 shows some displacement of natives out of low-
wage immigrant- intensive industries.
We find little evidence that inflows of immigrants are associated
with large or systematic effects on the employment or unemployment rates of36
less-skilled natives. Ourestimatesof the effect of immigration on native
wage rates are sensitive to the choice of specification and estimation
procedure. However, when we consider first differences between 1980 and
1970 and useaninstrumental variables estimation procedure to control for
endogeneity of immigrant inflow, we find that an increase of .01 in the
fraction of immigrants in an SMSA reduces legs-skilled native wages by
roughly 1.2 percent.References
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David Card on request.Table 1
Predicted Effect of an Increase in Im•igration on Unskilled Wage Ratesa'






ofSkilled forUnskilled Labor (a)
.25 1.0 3.0
1. —.25 .1 -—— —.31 —.42
1.0 -—— -.27 -.30
2. 0 .1 -.27 -.39 —.45
1.0 -.29 -.30 -.31
3 .5 .1 -.42 -.46 -.48
1.0 -.32 -.33 —.33
4. 1.0 .1 —.49 —.49 —.49
1.0 -.34 —.34 —.34
'See text for notation and assuptlons.
'Share-welghted average of substitution elasticities of skilled and unskilled
labor with capital is constrained to equal .6.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Dropouts 1.06 1.00 1.09 1.03 .99 .85
2.White Female
No College 1.09 1.08 1.05 1.03 1.10 1.12
3.Black Males
No College .94 .94 .97 .93 .91 .91
4.Black Females
No College 1.24 1.15 1.28 1.06 1.20 1.16
Note: See text for definition of index. High—immigrant cities
include 20 SMSA's with highest fraction of less-skilled
immigrants. Low—immigrant cities include 40 SMSA's with












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Effects of Immigration on Four Groups of Less-Skilled Natives
Pooled Sample






























































equations include the average education and age of the subgroup in
the SMSA (with subgroup specific slopes and Intercepts), as well as
total population in the SMSA. The sample size is 424.
"Esti.ated by instrumental variables. Thechange in the fraction of
immigrants in the SMSA is instrumented with the fraction of immigrants
In 1970 and its square.Table 8
Effects of Immigration on Black Males with Less Than 13 Years Educationa'
(standard errors in parentheses)
Cross -sectional First-Differenced
1970 1980 1980-1970 1980-1970ivb/
Outcome Variable:












3. Employmenc/ -.165 .046























a/All equations includeaverage age and




b/Estimated by instrumental variables.See note to Table7.Table 9
Effects of Inmiiration on WhiteMaleswithLessThan 12 Years Educational
(standard errors in parentheses)
Cross -sectional Firs t-Differenced
1980-1970 1980-19701vb' 1970 1980
Outcome Variable:
1. Labor Force/ -.193 -.079 .066 .036
Population (.075) (.083) (.149) (.231)
2. Employment!
-.279 -.159 .349 .109
Population (.101) (.112) (.186) (.289)
3. Eniployment/
-.107 -.110 .343 .086
Labor Force (.053) (.074) (.134) (.211)
1FractionWorked -.151 -.215 - .145 - .609
Last Year (.070) (.078) (.136) (.211)
5. Log Weeks -.223 -.312 - .018 - .190
Worked (.074) (.106) (.211) (.328)
6. Log Earnings! -.264 -.178 - .356 -1.103
Week (.201) (.212) (.406) (.637)
a/All equations includeaverage age andeducation in theSMSA, as wellas
total population. The sample size is120.
b/Estimated by instrumental variables.See note to Table7.Table 10
Effects of Immigration on Black Females with Less Than 13 Years Educationa/'
(standard errors in parentheses)
Cross -sectional Firsc-Differenced
1970 1980 1980-1970 1980-1970
Outcome Variable:
1. Labor Force! -.216 -.063 -.154 -.221
Population (.179) (.119) (.256) (.357)
2. Employment/ -.221 .003 .149 .032
Population (.192) (.128) (.269) (.374)
3. Employment!
-.037 .073 .457 .320
Labor Force (.105) (.086) (.186) (.259)
4. Fraction Worked -.165 -.127 .054 -.219
Last Year (.169) (.120) (.272) (.379)
5. Log Weeks -.247 .143 .735 .217
Worked (.232) (.143) (.387) (.542)
6. Log Earnings!1.213 .533 -.838 -1.369
Week (.402) (.236) (.609) (.848)
a/All equations include average age and education in the SMSA, as well as
total population. The sample size is 94.
b/Estimated by instrumental variables. See note to Table 7.Table 11
Effects of Immigration on White Females with Less Than 13 Years Educational
(standard errors in parentheses)
Cross-sectional First-Differenced
1970 1980 1980-1970 1980-1970 IV'
Outcome Variable:
1. Labor Force/ -.037 .058 .273 -.044
Population (.144) (.097) (.137) (.207)
2. Employment!
-.095 .027 .420 -.089
Population (.150) (.105) (.154) (.240)
3. Employment/
-.132 -.045 .306 -.017
Labor Force (.058) (.045) (.125) (.190)
4. Fraction Worked -.047 .005 .189 -.162
Last Year (.145) (.098) (.146) (.222)
5. Log Weeks -.094 -.118 .133 .335
Worked (.170) (.110) (.270) (.399)
6. Log Earnings/ .667 .397 .309 -.955
Week (.245) (.132) (.430) (.663)
a/All equations includeaverage age and education in the SMSA, as well as
total population. The sample size is 120.
b/Estimated by instrumental variables. See note to Table 7.